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NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION - STATE
INQUIRY INTO TEACHERS' ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS
As a condition of employment in state-supported schools or
colleges, an Arkansas statute' required that each teacher annual-
ly file an affidavit listing every organization to which he had
belonged or regularly contributed for the preceding five years.
Plaintiffs, teachers in the Arkansas school system, brought sep-
arate class actions in state and federal district courts challeng-
ing the statute on the ground that it violated the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2 Both courts upheld the
statute. Upon consolidated appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed, four Justices dissenting.3 The unlimited
scope of the disclosures required by the statute, where narrower
alternatives existed, went "far beyond what might be justified
in the exercise of the state's legitimate inquiry into the fitness
and competency of its teachers, '" 4 unreasonably interfering with
their freedom of association protected by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960).
Freedom of association is recognized by the Supreme Court
as a fundamental liberty guaranteed by the first amendment,
and is protected from unreasonable state interference by the
fourteenth amendment.5 The state, however, has an interest in
the loyalty, fitness, and competency of its employees, and may
require the disclosure of information relevant to determining
their suitability for employment., Refusal to answer such in-
1. Ark. Acts 1958 (2 B.S.), No. 10: "Section 1. It is hereby determined that
it will be beneficial to the public schools and institutions of higher learning and
the State of Arkansas, if certain affidavits of membership are required as herein-
after provided."
"Section 5. Every person who shall wilfully file a false affidavit . . .shall be
guilty of perjury, shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred dollars
($500.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00), and in addition shall
forfeit his license to teach in any of the schools, institutions of higher learning, or
other educational institutions supported wholly or in part by public funds in this
State .. "
2. Shelton v. McKinley, 174 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Ark. 1959) ; Carr v. Young,
231 Ark. 641, 331 S.W.2d 701 (1960).
3. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). Mr. Justices Frankfurter, Clark,
Harlan, and Whittaker. Id. at 490. Mr. Justice Harlan (separate dissenting
opinion). Id. at 496.
4. Id. at 490.
5. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960) : "And it is now beyond dis-
pute that freedom of association for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing
grievances is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from invasion by the States."
6. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). In Beilan v. Board of
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quiries is justification for dismissal,7 as is membership in pro-
scribed organizations where the state can show the employees'
knowledge of the organization's illegal purpose." Freedom of
association is necessarily impaired by any required disclosure of
one's membership in any organization, but a legitimate govern-
mental purpose not unjustifiably encroaching upon the individ-
ual interest does not offend the due process clause when the legis-
lation elicits information relevant to the purpose." Thus, two
distinct inquiries are made where the constitutionality of such
an undertaking is at issue: whether the legitimate governmental
interest justifies the abridgement, and if so, whether the inquiry
or information sought is relevant to the interest.
In the instant case the Court recognized the state's legitimate
purpose of inquiry into the fitness and competency of teachers but
deemed irrelevant to this inquiry a listing of every organization
to which they had belonged or regularly contributed for the pre-
ceding five years. In arriving at its decision the Court noted the
lack of teacher job security in Arkansas10 and alluded to the like-
lihood that the disclosures would cause serious abridgement of
free association, inhibition of the free spirit essential to the class-
room, and retardation of scholarship, trust, and the willingness
to study and evaluate. Notwithstanding these considerations, the
Court disposed of the constitutional issue on the narrower basis
that the inquiry was irrelevant to the legislative purpose. The
practical effect of this decision limits the purpose which the state
may pursue in this area by requiring inquiries to be carefully
drawn so as to reveal only that information which must neces-
sarily be relevant to the state's interest in determining the suit-
ability of its employees.
Public Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958), the Court said there was no requirement
in the Federal Constitution that a teacher's classroom conduct be the sole basis
for determining his fitness.
7. Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) ; Beilan v. Board of Public Education,
357 U.S. 399 (1958).
8. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) ; Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183 (1952) (Oklahoma Supreme Court construed the statute to exclude
persons from state employment solely on the basis of membership, thus violating
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment) ; Garner v. Board of Public
Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951).
9. Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449 (1958) (no justification for the state's purposes to require disclosure of mem-
bership lists).
10. Arkansas law provided for automatic renewal of teachers' contracts if
teachers were not notified within ten days after the end of the school year that
their contracts had not been renewed. ARK. STATS. § 80-1304(b) (Supp. 1961).
Thus, teachers enjoy no tenure of office or job security beyond a period of one
school year.
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The four dissenting Justices" disagreed with the majority's
finding that the inquiry was irrelevant. They did not concede
that the state could discover all information relevant to teacher
suitability by requiring less than full disclosure. Nor did they
attribute to the adoption of the statute a purpose to employ it
as a means to accomplish that which is constitutionally forbid-
den. In a separate dissenting opinion12 Justice Harlan recognized
the difficulty of fixing the scope of inquiry in advance so that it
would yield only relevant information.
A difficult question raised by the instant case is whether
or not the required information was relevant to the legitimate
legislative purpose of determining the suitability of teachers for
employment. It is submitted that the information sought may
have served a number of useful purposes: school authorities
could place teachers in areas of instruction more suitable to their
backgrounds; members of listed organizations would be potential
sources for personal references; and an indication of time spent
in particular outside activities would be furnished. Notwith-
standing these useful possibilities, it appears that the majority
opinion was influenced by the serious impairment to the exercise
of free association, along with the realization that Arkansas'
purpose13 may have been to withhold employment from members
of groups deemed unpopular by community standards. That the
Court sought to avoid such findings and did so by disposing of
the case on the narrower basis quite properly precluded any ex-
amination of legislative motives.
The basis for the instant case holding is legally sound. After
finding a legitimate governmental interest justifying the abridg-
ment of free association, the Court found that the information
sought was irrelevant to the purpose. The fact that the Court
may have been influenced by a possible legislative purpose to
discourage membership in unpopular organizations does not de-
tract from the desirability of the analytical process employed.
11. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1900). See note 3 supra.
12. 364 U.S. 479, 496 (1960).
13. Ark. Acts 1958 (2 E.S.), No. 10, § 1 quoted note 1 supra; id. § 7: "It is
hereby determined that the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the
school segregation cases require solution of a great variety of local public school
problems of considerable complexity immediately and which involve the health,
safety and general welfare of the people of the State of Arkansas, and that the
purpose of this act is to assist in the solution of these problems and to provide for
the more efficient administration of public education. Therefore, an emergency is
hereby declared to exist, and this act being necessary for the preservation of the
public peace, health and safety, shall take effect and be in force from the date of
its approval."
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By virtue of this analysis the state is able to determine the suit-
ability of its employees, yet the individual is protected in his
fundamental rights inasmuch as they may not be unreasonably
impaired.
David S. Bell
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION -
ASSESSMENT OF COMPENSATING USE TAX ON PROPERTY
MANUFACTURED BY USER
Plaintiff manufactured certain oil well service units in Okla-
homa and shipped the finished units to Louisiana for use in his
business. He then paid the Louisiana use tax1 on them based
on the cost of the materials used in their manufacture.2 The
Louisiana Collector of Revenue assessed a deficiency for failure
to pay the use tax on the value of the goods attributable to labor
and shop overhead. Plaintiff paid the alleged deficiency under
protest, and instituted suit for refund. The trial court rendered
judgment for the plaintiff. On appeal to the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, held, reversed. The use tax is measured by the value
of the property at the time it becomes taxable by the state.
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 241 La. 67, 127
So.2d 502 (1961).
The United States Supreme Court has held that the com-
merce clause of the Federal Constitutions forbids a state from
using its economic powers to affect transactions occurring be-
yond its borders.4 Thus it has been held that a state sales tax
is limited by the Constitution to transactions occurring within
the taxing state.5 Because of this limitation, states which as-
sessed sales taxes were faced with the problem that residents
made their purchases in neighboring states which imposed no
such taxes. This resulted in a loss of revenue and put local mer-
1. LA. R.S. 47:301-318 (1950).
2. The plaintiff was exempted from paying the Oklahoma sales tax because
he manufactured for export. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1251d (1951).
3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
4. See Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935). Cf. Welton v. Missouri, 91
U.S. 275 (1875).
5. McLeod v. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944) : "[A] tax on an
interstate sale . . . involves an assumption of power by a State which the Com-
merce Clause was meant to end." See Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340
(1954) ; McGoldriok v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
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